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 Belonging and Trust: Divorce and Social Capital 
 
Margaret F. Brinig 
 
 In other work, I have discussed at some length how trust functions 
within ongoing marriages and families.1 Marriages, I claim, “are 
viewed as good when the spouses trust each other. They founder when 
trust is no longer there.”2 When a wife, typically, loses trust in her 
husband’s acting unselfishly and for the benefit of the marriage, she 
may file for divorce.3  Meanwhile, trust is the foundation for teaching 
children about love—love of parents for each other, love they have for 
you, and how God loves.4 The loss of trust that dissolution of mar-
riage occasions is both immediate and carried from one generation to 
the next. This paper explores how that trust relates to belonging and to 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., MARGARET F. BRINIG, FAMILY, LAW AND COMMUNITY: SUPPORTING THE 
COVENANT 60–63 (2010); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “I Only Want Trust”: Norms, 
Trust, and Autonomy, 32 J. SOCIOECONOMICS 471 (2003).  
2 BRINIG, supra note 1, at 70. 
3 Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 473. In fact, work by Liana Sayer and Susanne Bianchi 
shows that the wife’s satisfaction with the relationship predicts divorce, while his does not. Liana 
Sayer & Susanne Bianchi, Women’s Economic Independence and the Probability of Divorce: A 
Review and Reexamination, 21 J. FAM. ISSUES 906, 932 (2000) (“Wives who believe that their 
marriages are troubled have odds of divorce twice as high as wives who do not believe their 
marriages are troubled. Women who feel that their marriage is unhappy have risks of divorce 
within the subsequent 5 years almost 2.5 times as high compared to wives who do not feel their 
marriage is unhappy . . . . Interestingly, none of the husband’s predictors of marital stability is 
associated with higher risks of marital dissolution.”). Women most often file for divorce despite 
the possible financial losses. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made 
for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 127 (2000) 
(stating that women file about two thirds of the time). Other research, based on the National 
Survey of Families and Households, concludes that women are actually the ones desirous of end-
ing the relationship  (i.e., the predominance in filing behavior corresponds to dissatisfaction with 
the marriage). Sanford L. Braver et al., Who Divorced Whom? Methodological and Theoretical 
Issues, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993); see also Frequency Distribution of Respon-
dents’ Reports of Which Spouse Wanted the First Marriage to End, by Sex: National Survey of 
Families and Households, 1987–88 and 1992–94, reprinted in Brinig & Allen, supra, at 159 app. 
The citation to the study is Brinig & Allen, supra, at 129. Another paper found that the same is 
true of a sample of divorces in Texas. James Alan Neff et al., Divorce Likelihood Among An-
glos and Mexican Americans, 15 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 75, 83, tbl.1 (1991) (stating that 
Spanish-surnamed women filed 59% of the time). 
4 Steven L. Nock, Can Law Shape the Development of Unconditional Love in Children?, 
in BEST LOVE OF THE CHILD  (Timothy P. Jackson ed., forthcoming 2010); see also JENNIFER 
ROBACK MORSE, LOVE AND ECONOMICS: WHY THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE FAMILY WON’T WORK 
(2001). 
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the related concept of social capital. 
The argument, using statistics to bolster every step, is essentially 
that marital stability involves trust:  trust by the spouses in each other, 
trust by each spouse in the institution of marriage, and trust by each in 
the support of the outside community. The married person “belongs” 
to the spouse, to the family, to the shared idea of marriage, and to the 
surrounding community, and this linked network supports the mar-
riage. When any of these links of trust weakens or fails, the marriage 
becomes less stable.  
I begin the argument with the links of trust that run between gen-
erations. Tables 1–3 show that the loss of trust continues between 
generations and reveal two ways that mechanism may work. A March 
2010 Census report shows, among its other findings taken from the 
National Survey of Family Growth (2002), that while about half of all 
Americans between fifteen and forty-four cohabit at some point, they 
are significantly more likely to do so if their parents were not living 
together at the time the young people were fourteen.5 In other words, 
if the parents were not living together in an intact relationship at the 
time of the child’s adolescence, the child was less likely to move di-
rectly into marriage for a first union.6 Further, if the wife’s parents 
were divorced when she was fourteen, the wife in the present genera-
tion was 1.73 times more likely to herself divorce.7 This finding from 
the mid-1990s is echoed in the recent Census report (for women aged 
fifteen to forty-four, the probability of a first marriage surviving ten 
years is only two-thirds as high if the woman’s parents were not living 
together when she was fourteen).8 Venturing away from the respon-
dents’ parents themselves, my earlier work with Steven Nock reported 
that respondents to the National Survey of Families and Households 
were 2.67 times more likely to divorce if they lived in a state where 
                                                          
5 The use of various ages at which respondents are questioned was determined by the way 
the questions were asked by the Census, the National Survey of Families and Households, and so 
forth. These arbitrary assessments should not change the findings in any systematic way. Since 
age fifteen is, in the vast majority of states, the earliest age in which people can marry, even 
with parental permission, the Census’s use of 15–44 for persons of childbearing age was proba-
bly not an accidental choice. The age of fourteen has legal significance as well, since in many 
states children may then choose with which parent they’d like to live if the parents divorce. But I 
am not sure that either reason swayed the Census Bureau in framing questions. 
6 See infra Table 1 (noting the change in the “Ever cohabitated” column, which is be-
tween 47.5% and 60.8%). 
7 See infra Table 2 (noting “Wife’s parents divorced”). 
8 See infra Table 3. 
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the divorce rate was high in the year they were sixteen.9  
 
 Table 1. Relationship between parents’ living arrangements and 
child’s subsequent cohabitation  
 
Number of  
cohabiting partners 
Characteristic 
Number 
in  
thousands Total 
Never 
Cohabited 
Ever  
cohabited 1.0 2.0 
3 or 
more 
Parental living arrangements at age 14     
Two biologi-
cal or adop-
tive parents 49,939 100.0 52.5 47.5 32.1 10.8 4.7 
Other 11,622 100.0 39.3 60.8 39.5 13.6 7.6 
 
Table 2. Odds of divorce as a function of marital status of the 
population in the state and year the respondent was 1610 
Variable name  B  exp B  
Cohabited before marriage  
0.333 
(0.131)**  
1.395  
Number of children  
−0.489 
(0.06)***  
0.613  
Husband’s wages  
0.001 
(0.00)***  
1  
Wife’s wages  0.001 
(0.00)**  
1  
Husband is black  
0.426  
(0.186)* 
1.531  
Husband is Hispanic  
−0.343 
(0.258)  
0.709  
Husband is Asian  
−0.438 
(0.73)  
0.645  
                                                          
9 See infra Table 2 (last lines); Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 483 & tbl.2. 
10 Table adapted from Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 471, 483 & tbl.2. B is the coeffi-
cient in the regression equation. The standard error is in parentheses and indicates how closely 
associated with the value for B was each error the sample data generated. The statistical signific-
ance is indicated by the asterisks, with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. P 
is the probability that the correlation coefficient value was reached by chance. In the first line of 
Table 2, the ** therefore indicates that the likelihood the coefficient was accidental is only about 
1%. When the result is a single value (divorce or no divorce), the exponent of B (or likelihood) 
is a measure of effect size—how much of a difference in the likelihood of divorce, say, does 
cohabiting before marriage make (here 1.395), with values in excess of 1 indicating that divorce 
is more likely to occur given cohabitation.  
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Husband is American Indian  
−0.088 
(0.561)  
0.918  
Spouses are of the same race  
−0.012 
(0.079)  
0.989  
Wife’s highest level of education  −0.006 
(0.03)  
0.994  
Husband’s parents divorced11  −0.113 
(0.154)  
0.894  
Wife’s parents divorced  0.549 
(0.136)***  
1.731  
Husband’s age when married  0.017 
(0.11)  
1.017  
Wife’s age when married  0.19 
(0.018)***  
1.209  
DIVPC (% divorced)  0.984  
(0.059)*** 
2.675  
SEPPC (% separated)  0.415  
(0.092)*** 
1.514  
NEVPC (% never married)  
−0.012 
(0.014)*  
0.972  
 
DIVPC, percent divorced in respondent’s then state in year when 
respondent was sixteen; SEPPC, percent separated in respondent’s 
then state in year when respondent was sixteen; NEVPC, percent nev-
er married in respondent’s then state in year when respondent was six-
teen. 
 
Table 3. Probability that a first marriage will remain intact (survive) 
at specified durations, by selected characteristics and with standard 
errors, for women aged fifteen to forty-four:  United States, 2002.12 
 
 
1 year 3 years 5 years 10 years 
Characteristic 
Probability 
of survival 
Probability of 
survival 
Probability 
of survival 
Probability 
of survival13 
                                                          
11 Sayer & Bianchi, supra note 3, consider reasons for the dissymmetry between husbands’ 
and wives’ parents. 
12 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  
A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY 
GROWTH, ser. 23, no. 28, at 32 & tbl.16 (2010). 
13 The average length of a marriage’s duration if it ends at divorce was 8.2 years for men 
and 7.9 years for women in 2001. ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, NUMBER, TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 2001, 1, 9 tbl.6 
(2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-97.pdf. Figure 2 shows that the yearly per-
cent of first marriages for women that end in divorce peaks at 4% between seven and eight 
years. Id. at 10 fig.2. This timing may affect the much larger spread between the two parental 
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Parental living arrangements at age 14 
Two biological 
or adoptive 
parents 
0.95 
(0.004) 
0.86 
(0.006) 
0.79 
(0.008) 
0.67 
(0.012) 
Other 
0.93 
(0.008) 
0.82 
(0.019) 
0.72 
(0.021) 
0.48 
(0.045) 
 
Taken together, the three tables show that if parents divorced, 
their children are more likely to cohabit.14 A marriage preceded by the 
child’s cohabitation (whether or not solely with one’s spouse) gives a 
greater likelihood of divorce.15 And when a child goes through adoles-
cence with more examples of divorced people around (the proportion 
of divorced in the state when the child was sixteen), there’s a sepa-
rate, and in fact larger, likelihood that the child’s eventual marriage 
will dissolve.16 
Children of divorce may cohabit because they know, from person-
al experience, that marriage may not work out and they want to be ab-
solutely sure before they make a more substantial commitment. They 
may also feel they can take advantage of all the good points and risk 
none of the bad points of marriage by cohabiting.17 In other words, 
they may have either a more cautious or a less sanguine attitude about 
marriage (or, I suppose, both). Once they cohabit, they are more apt 
to see their relationship in terms of the short-term, exchange model, in 
which they expect immediate reciprocation for anything they contri-
bute to the marriage or the partner.18  It is then difficult to transition 
to marriage, with its unconditional giving.19 Similarly, children grow-
                                                                                                                                  
arrangements that occurs in the ten years (column 5) and five years (column 4) probabilities of 
survival. Id. 
14 Supra Table 1. 
15 Supra Table 2. While studies using U.S. data consistently show this, data from conti-
nental Europe show that cohabitation followed by marriage may be a more stable arrangement. 
Kathleen Kiernan, Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 98 POPULATION TRENDS 
11, 19 tbl.11 (1999). 
16 Supra Table 3. 
17 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnerships and Default Rules, in 
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 269–83 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006); see also Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE 
FAMILY, supra, at 305. 
18 For another discussion of the problems of exchange, see Robert C. Ellickson, Unpack-
ing the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 223, 305 (2006) 
(concluding that intimate relationships are very difficult to maintain if based on tit-for-tat ex-
changes, for “temporary imbalances of trade are likely to arise”). 
19 See Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. 
276 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 25 
 
ing through their teens with more divorce around may downplay the 
difficulties of divorce or may not have as much exposure to good, 
lasting marriages.20 
Prominent proponents of social capital theory argue that in neigh-
borhoods where trust decreases and there is less social cohesion and 
more disorder, there will eventually be more crime.21 While this hypo-
thesis does not go unchallenged,22 it is at least easy to follow. This 
paper will go still further, showing from recent Chicago divorces 
(Cook County divorces from late 2002–2007) that, holding other as-
pects of the community constant, disruptions in social capital also pre-
cede increased divorces. Thus, trust between spouses keeps marriages 
together.23 Trust is more difficult to maintain without trust in the insti-
tution of marriage itself (as with the divorce of one’s parents24 or oth-
ers one knows25). As will be shown, generalized trust that others in 
your neighborhood will “be there for you” affects one’s sense of be-
longing—even to a spouse—as well. 
James Coleman used schools as one example illustrating his con-
ception of social capital.26 He argued that successful schools tended to 
                                                                                                                                  
FAM. ISSUES 53, 56–57 (1995) (“[P]rior cohabitors have poorer quality marriages than those 
who did not cohabit prior to marriage.”); Steven L. Nock, Turn-Taking as Rational Behavior, 27 
SOC. SCI. RES. 235, 239–44 (1998) (discussing the role of turn-taking in marriage). 
20 See Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 484, 483 tbl.2 (showing that a 16-year-old residing 
in “a state with a high percentage of divorced adults” will have a “higher chance[] of divorce 
when [that] individual becomes an adult”).  
21 The literature is extensive. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, 
and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1527 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, So-
cial Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367 (1997); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen 
W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken 
Windows,” 67 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 319 (2004); Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and 
Violent Crime: A Multivariate Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997). Sampson 
and Raudenbush argued that disorder might “turn out to be important for understanding migra-
tion patterns, investment by businesses, and overall neighborhood viability,” especially if it “op-
erates in a cascading fashion—encouraging people to move (increasing residential instability) or 
discouraging efforts at building collective responses.”  Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Rau-
denbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban 
Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 637 (1999). 
22 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN 
WINDOWS POLICING (2001); Bernard E. Harcourt, & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evi-
dence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006); 
Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the 
Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163 (2004). 
23 Brinig & Nock, supra note 1, at 473, 474–76. 
24 See supra Table 2. 
25 See supra Table 3. 
26 James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. 
S95 (1988). Another example in the article was the diamond market, where relationships func-
tioned as extralegal and comparatively inexpensive sources of control. Id. at S98. 
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be distinguished by parents’ connections to their children’s school and 
to the parents of their children’s peers. These connections, he rea-
soned, “closed the loop” between school, teachers, and parents, thus 
guaranteeing the enforcement of appropriate norms.27 Coleman further 
argued that these kinds of connections—and the norm-enforcement au-
thority that they enabled—helped explain Catholic high schools’ ex-
tremely low drop-out rates in particular.28 Conceivably, elements of 
this distinctive character also generate positive externalities beyond the 
classroom walls. For example, Catholic schools’ emphasis on discip-
line inside the school might affect the behavior of teenage students, 
some of whom might be graduates, outside the school, in the sur-
rounding neighborhood.29 Additionally, the demands that Catholic 
schools make of parents may generate social capital by closing the 
network between parent, school, child, and neighborhood. More gen-
erally, a resident who counts on her neighbors to address community 
problems has less cause to seek to move to a new community; a resi-
dent who does not know her neighbors—or worse, does not trust 
them—tends not to enlist their assistance in efforts to address neigh-
borhood problems.30 
Other positive effects of social capital are being considered cur-
rently in the public health literature.31 One study has determined that 
                                                          
27 For more recent work along these lines see MIKE SAVAGE, ET AL., GLOBALIZATION & 
BELONGING (2005) (qualitative study of the nature of local belonging in a global world, focusing 
on northwest England); Gaynor Bagnall et al., Children, Belonging and Social Capital: The PTA 
and Middle Class Narratives of Social Involvement in the North-West of England, 8 SOC. RES. 
ONLINE 4 (2003), available at www.socresonline.org.uk/b8/4/bagnall.html (different patterns of 
generating social capital produced very different communities); Edward L. Glaeser et al., An 
Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. 437 (2002) (finding that social capital first 
rises and then falls with age, declines with expected mobility, rises in occupations with greater 
returns to social skills, is higher among homeowners, falls sharply with physical distance, and is 
more pronounced among those who invest in human capital also invest in social capital, but also 
finding no significant effect of religious denomination). 
28 Coleman, supra note 26, at S115 tbl.2. 
29 Id. at S112–18. 
30 Chris L. Gibson et al., Social Integration, Individual perceptions of Collective Efficacy, 
and Fear of Crime in Three Cities, 19 JUST. Q. 537, 559 (2002) (“[S]ocial integration ha[s] the 
most important effect on individual perceptions of collective efficacy.”); Sampson & Rauden-
bush, supra note 21.  
31 See, e.g., Jonathan Lomas, Social Capital and Health:  Implications for Public Health 
and Epidemiology, 47 SOC. SCI. MED. 1181 (1998) (discussing a Canadian study of heart prob-
lems that suggests more concentration on levels higher than the typical individual one); Ichiro 
Kawachi et al., Social Capital and Self-Rated Health: A Contextual Analysis, 89 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1187 (1999) (reporting more self-rated poor health among those with lowest levels of 
social trust compared on statewide basis); Sarah Wakefield & Blake Poland, Family, Friend or 
Foe? Critical Reflections on the Relevance and Role of Social Capital in Health Promotion and 
Community Development, 60 SOC. SCI. MED. 2819 (2005) (stating that it is important to be con-
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social capital in Philadelphia,32 measured by questions similar to the 
ones I will use here, produced measurable health effects on citizens of 
the neighborhoods studied.33 They found that adults with high social 
capital were less likely to report fair or poor health (10% of the high 
social capital group compared to 23.7% of the low social capital 
group).34 On the other hand, adults with low social capital were nearly 
twice as likely to have been diagnosed with a mental health condi-
tion.35 They were also twice as likely to be under extreme stress as 
those with high social capital.36 
This project extends the work of those working on connections be-
tween social capital and crime and social capital and health to consider 
its effect on neighborhood-level divorce rates in the city of Chicago. 
In order to make the connection, data was gathered from several 
sources. First, I obtained a complete sample of all divorces in Chicago 
beginning in September of 2002 and ending in December of 2007.37 
Second, the human capital data, described below, was obtained from 
the University of Michigan’s Interuniversity Consortium for Political 
and Social Research (ICPSR).38 This data, used to measure social co-
                                                                                                                                  
cerned with social justice and the potential negative consequences of social capital development; 
Canadian). 
32 The Pennsylvania study cites to ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE 
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2002), for its variable choice. This work popularized 
the more academic piece of Coleman, supra note 26, which preceded it by three years. The cita-
tion appears in Social Capital Report at 11 n.4; and also is discussed in Kawachi et al., supra 
note 31, at 1191 (questions from the General Social Survey); and Lomas, supra note 31, at 1183. 
33 PHILA. HEALTH MGMT. CORP., COMTY. HEALTH DATABASE, HEALTH IN CONTEXT: 
AN EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA (2004). “The indica-
tors used to create the scale included: respondents’ sense of belonging in their neighborhood, 
sense of trust in neighbors, whether respondents felt that their neighbors were willing to help 
each other, whether neighbors had ever worked together, and whether respondents participated in 
community organizations, groups, and events in their neighborhood.” Id. at 11 n.9. The authors 
grouped and clustered these to create a single index. COMMUNITY HEALTH DATA BASE, 
www.phmc.org/chdb (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) 
34 PHILA. HEALTH MGMT. CORP., supra note 33, at 9. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 10. 
37 RECORD INFORMATION SERVICES, http://www.public-record.com (last visited Feb. 18, 
2011). There were 6,515 divorces in the sample. Id. Addresses were recorded and their census 
tracts identified, using batch geocoding from https://webgis.usc.edu/Services/Geocode/Batch 
Process/Default.aspx. 
38 From a large number of the 343 neighborhoods studied, a sample of 6,000 residents 
answered questions about their neighborhoods. The neighborhood cohesion variables come from 
this dataset. For a description of the project, see Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 21, at 615–
16; FELTON J. EARLS  & CHRISTIE A. VISHER, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PROJECT ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS: A RESEARCH UPDATE 
(1997),  available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/163603.pdf. 
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hesion, was originally collected by the Project on Human Develop-
ment in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) in 1994-95.39  
Figure 1 Social Cohesion by Census Tract 
 
                                                          
39 For a general discussion of the PHDCN and its relation to closed parochial schools, see 
Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Urban Neighborhoods, and Edu-
cation Reform, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887 (2010). This paper demonstrates the relationship 
between the closing of Catholic schools and a decrease in various social capital variables (social 
cohesion, physical disorder, and social disorder). The paper discussing the extension of the mod-
el to crime in Chicago is Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools and Bro-
ken Windows, Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 10-04, SSRN abstract no. 1629904 (Feb. 
14, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564254&download 
=yes. For this paper I have selected only one measure of social capital discussed in the papers 
with Garnett. While social and physical disorder are obviously connected to at least minor levels 
of crime such as vandalism and disorderly behavior (and may even be measuring it), their rela-
tionship to divorce is at best not obvious. On the other hand, social cohesion, at least on the ex-
tended family and friends level, does matter for marital quality. For two measures of how this 
works, consider that covenant marriages in Louisiana had more attendees than standard marriag-
es. The covenant marriage couples were signaling their greater commitment to each other, and 
had, on average, the full support of their families. They so far are divorcing at a lower rate as 
well. BRINIG, supra note 1, at n.177. A Study by Rose Kreider of interracial couples found that 
when black men were married to white women, the marriages were most successful when the 
wife saw her mother frequently (and when the husband was religious). Id. at 165 & n.102. I ob-
tained similar results, for the other two social capital variables, social and physical disorder. The 
coefficients for social disorder were, as expected, significant and positive. Those for physical 
disorder were negative and significant. Apparently women, who largely file for divorce, are re-
luctant to do so as the neighborhood becomes less safe. The other values in both sets of equa-
tions performed as they did for social cohesion. Results are available upon request. 
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A third source of data, socioeconomic in nature, was obtained 
from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses at the level of census tracts.40 To 
deal with what economists call an endogeneity problem, what is called 
an instrumental variable was used: whether or not a parochial school 
in the neighborhood closed before collection of the social cohesion da-
ta. That is, because divorce may well cause social disorder as well as 
being caused by it,41 we needed to identify some data that would be 
unlikely to itself be affected by lack of cohesion. For this reason, I in-
clude variables obtained from the Archdiocese of Chicago42 and the 
Official Catholic Directory43 on pastors and the closing of Catholic 
schools in the City of Chicago, 1984–2004. The idea is that while 
school closings precipitated by a lack of pastor connection might influ-
ence social capital in neighborhoods, neither socioeconomic changes 
nor social capital predict such things as the age of the pastor or 
whether he left his assignment sooner than the customary six years.  
                                                          
40 For this I used software provided by Geolytics. 
41 See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION:  HUMAN NATURE AND THE 
RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER 115–17 (1999). This could be because many divorcing 
people also move, and there is usually less social capital in a new neighborhood. See Lynn Mag-
dol, The People You Know: The Impact of Residential Mobility on Mothers’ Social Network 
Ties, 17 J. SOC. & PERS. REL. 183 (2000). Studies discussing the disruption include Elisabeth L. 
Terhell et al., Network Dynamics in the Long-Term Period After Divorce, 21  J. SOC. & PERS. 
REL. 719 (2004) and Matthijs Kalmijn & Marjolein Broese van Groenou, Differential Effects of 
Divorce on Social Integration, 22 J. SOC. & PERS. REL. 455 (2005). 
42 Paul Simons, Closed School History: 1984–2004, ILLINOISLOOP.ORG, http://www 
.illinoisloop.org/cath_closed_school_84_04.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).  
43 Much of the publicly available data came from THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY 
(for years 1984–2004), an annual publication that lists each school in each diocese and archdi-
ocese, with parish information and the name of the pastor, as well as giving lists of all the mem-
bers of religious orders with their year of ordination. THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY 
enabled us to know when each pastor arrived in, and left, a parish. It also provided information 
on parishes led by “administrators” who were not priests. For 2008, Sr. Paul gave us a copy of 
the Archdiocese of Chicago 2008 Directory. This also listed the religious sisters as well as phone 
numbers of the various convents and religious houses, which we called for people who we 
couldn’t identify. Other people, such as some of the lay principals, were tracked by using inter-
net searches or the encyclopedic memory of Sr. Farley. Information on clergy abuse comes both 
from the official archdiocesan website, Priests with Substantiated Allegations of Sexual Miscon-
duct with Minors, ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO, http://www.archchicago.org/pdf/ten_year_report 
.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (listing information from 1983-1993), and by a larger collection 
(including some unsubstantiated reports), Accused Priests Who Worked in the Archdiocese of 
Chicago, BISHOPACCOUNTABILITY.ORG, http://www.bishop-accountability.org/il_chicago/ (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2011).  
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Figure 2 Divorce Rate by Census Tract, 2002–2007 
 
We begin by showing a simple correlation of divorce and social 
cohesion, measured at the neighborhood level. The fact that the result 
is negative and statistically significant (and large as far as these things 
go) alerts us to the possibility of a connection between the two. 
Though there could be other explanations, like divorce causing the 
lack of social cohesion, or some other factor causing both results, the 
statistical significance indicates that they are related more than by 
chance.44 
 
 Table 4. Correlation between Census Tract Level Divorce Rate and 
Social Cohesion  
 Social Cohesion 
Divorces per married couple in census tract -.117*** 
 
Because one can only divorce if previously married, the number of 
married couples in the census tract was used to create a local divorce 
rate. Inclusion of both accounts not only for those available to divorce 
but also those who might be available for later relationships. They 
might include sources of advice about marriage and divorce and others 
who might influence the success of a marriage such as children and 
the elderly. Some socioeconomic variables known to be related to di-
                                                          
44 A zero coefficient would mean that there was essentially no relationship between the 
two sets of data. A coefficient of `1 would indicate that the relationships was exactly reciprocal, 
that is, that as one increased, the other would decrease by the same amount. 
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vorce are racial proportions in the census tract (more divorces among 
African-Americans,45 and fewer among Hispanics46), and unemploy-
ment (typically more divorces in periods of unemployment47). Here 
are the descriptive statistics for the data used for this study. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics48 
  
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Black population 
2000 census 
.0000 .9980 .336392 .4114901 
Hispanic population 
2000 census 
.0000 .9696 .275913 .3080762 
Unemployment rate 
2000 census 
.0099 .3712 .118844 .0845804 
Social cohesion 2.9248 4.1107 3.376081 .2727141 
Total divorces .00 43.00 5.9167 6.02441 
Divorces per  
married couple 2000 
census 
.0000 .2416 .015731 .0215330 
Valid N (listwise)         
 
                                                          
45 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 12, at 12: 
Hispanic men had the highest probability that their first marriages would last 10 years 
or more (75%)—higher than any other race and ethnic group and higher than Hispanic 
women. The probability of non-Hispanic black men’s and women’s first marriages 
remaining intact for at least 10 years was about 50%. This compares with probabili-
ties of 64% for white men’s and women’s first marriages, 68% for Hispanic women’s 
first marriages, and 75% for Hispanic men’s first marriages remaining intact for at 
least 10 years. 
Id. 
46 Min-Ah Lee & Kenneth F. Ferraro, Perceived Discrimination and Health Among Puerto 
Rican and Mexican Americans: Buffering Effect of the Lazo Matrimonial?, 68 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 1966, 1966 (2009). According to the 2000 Census, Mexicans made up 70.4% of Chica-
go’s Hispanic Population. BETSY GUZMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
THE HISPANIC POPULATION: CENSUS 2000 BRIEF, 7 & n.14 (2001), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf. 
47 See, e.g., Morten Blekesaune, Unemployment and Partnership Dissolution (Inst. Soc. & 
Econ. Res. ISER Working Paper Ser. 2008-21), available at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ 
publications/working-papers/iser/2008-21.pdf (reporting that British longitudinal data is higher by 
33% for male unemployment and 83% for women). 
48 The panel consisted of 186 observations X 6 years for each, or a total of 1,116. Each 
observation counted the divorces in a single year in the census tract. There were a total of 6,603 
divorces in the city, 6,515 of which were in census tracts of interest. 
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Chicago may be the most residentially segregated city in the Unit-
ed States.49 While blacks currently make up about thirty-five percent 
of the population, they are heavily concentrated on the south and west 
sides of the city.50 Whites make up nearly twenty-eight percent but 
live largely on the north side,51 while Hispanics, now approaching 
thirty percent of the population, are scattered to the northwest and 
southwest sides of the city center.52 Unemployment ranged from very 
low in some census tracts to nearly ten times the 2000 national aver-
age of 4.0 percent.53 Social cohesion varied less, with both mean and 
median in the 3.3 range and a small standard deviation.54 While the 
total divorces varied considerably, this could be because there were 
fewer marriages (or people residing) in some census tracts. However, 
the divorces-per-married-couple, or divorce rate, still exhibits a wide 
variance (more than twice the rate for divorce per year). 
Perhaps the most informative table in this paper follows as Table 
6. This shows the results of sequential estimations (called a Two-Stage 
Least Squares Model) of social cohesion, measured in 1995, and the 
divorce rate (divorce per married couple) for partial year 2002 and 
complete years through 2007. It would not be surprising to see strong 
relationships between the socioeconomic variables and this local di-
vorce rate since other studies typically find them. What interests us 
here, however, is the relationship between the divorce rate and social 
cohesion. If the social capital theory can be extended to include the 
neighborhood environment’s effects on people’s family-level relation-
ships, the prediction would be a negative effect:  the less social cohe-
sion, the more divorce. That is just what we find in Table 6. 
 
                                                          
49 Azam Ahmed & Darnell Little, Chicago, America’s Most Segregated Big City, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 26, 2008, at 1. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION 
SURVEY, EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION, 1940S TO 
DATE, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/tables.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
54 The median was 3.33. 
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 Table 6. Divorce Rate in Chicago Census Tracts, 2002–2007 
(Multiple Stage Regression)55  
Variable  
Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Beta B 
(Constant) .036 
(.000)*** 
  
Percentage Black in census 
tract, 2000                       
.009 
(.000)*** 
.176 
Percentage Hispanic in 
census tract, 2000              
-.013 
(.000)*** 
-.176 
Unemployment rate, 2000    .020 
(.001) *** 
.073 
Perceived social cohesion     -.007 
(.000)*** 
-.088 
 
While the predictive value of this equation is quite limited—it does 
not explain a large amount of divorce,56—it is at least suggestive of 
two things. The first is that socioeconomic characteristics of the 
neighborhood do apparently have some influence on individual deci-
sion–making about marriage and divorce.57 The second is that social 
                                                          
55 The displayed coefficients are actually a function of three equations estimated simulta-
neously. The first predicts whether or not a Catholic school closed in the neighborhood in years 
between 1985 and 1993, as a function of the racial characteristics of the census tract (Black and 
Hispanic share of population, 1990 Census), some parish characteristics (whether or not the pas-
tor was an administrator serving out of rotation, or there was a parish clergyman accused of 
abuse, and the length of time since the pastor’s ordination) and the poverty rate in the census 
tract. The second predicts perceived social cohesion in the neighborhood measured in 1994-95 as 
a function of the Catholic school closing, between 1985 and 1993 and the socio-demographic 
characteristics noted above, weighted by the number of neighborhood persons appearing in the 
survey sample. The third, visible, predicts the number of divorces as a function of racial charac-
teristics in the census tract, 2000, the unemployment rate in 2000, perceived social cohesion as 
estimated above, population and the number married (both 2000). Not visible but included in the 
model are a series of year dummies that account for trends in the data.  
56 R2 (adjusted) =.118, system R2 = .343. Perhaps the reason it does is not obvious. Ma-
rital distress is to a large extent the individual couple’s issue. Divorce has long been hypothe-
sized to occur in the cases where spouses are badly matched. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker et al., 
An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1157 (1977). It also may 
occur when wives feel emotionally unsupported by their husbands or when they become econom-
ically independent, Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, supra note 3, at 937, or when they 
cannot have children or have children of the “wrong” sex, Sara Raley & Suzanne Bianchi, Sons, 
Daughters, and Family Processes: Does Gender of Children Matter? 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 401 
(2006). Divorce can of course follow domestic violence, addiction, or serious illness, none of 
which are accounted for in the equation. 
57 This can be seen from the table because the standardized coefficient (Beta) for perceived 
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cohesion, controlling for other general characteristics of a neighbor-
hood, does have an effect on marital stability. This effect is more 
significant than the unemployment rate in the neighborhood. As ex-
pected, when unemployment increases, so does the divorce rate.  
Figure 3 Relative Effects on Divorce Rate 
 
How much does this mean, in real terms? In Figure 3, I’ve 
charted the socio-economic variables and social cohesion using the 
minimum and maximum values of each, showing the effect of that 
single variable (obtained from the regression coefficients in Table 6 
above) on the constant. Table 6 shows that yearly divorce rate, 2002–
2007, will increase from .036 to .045, an increase of twenty percent, 
if the percentage Black moves from zero to 100 percent. Since there is 
always some amount of social cohesion (and it always helps reduce the 
divorce rate), moving from the low value to the high value decreases 
divorces from about .015 to about .007, a decrease of slightly more 
than fifty percent. This is certainly meaningful.58 
                                                                                                                                  
social cohesion is -.088, while that unemployment is .073. The standardized coefficient for social 
cohesion is about half that of the percentages of African-Americans or Hispanics in the census 
tract.  
58 Although it did here, divorce does not always run in the same direction as unemploy-
ment. As Bradford Wilcox noted in the National Review, “[D]ivorce is down (modestly) in the 
first full year of the Great Recession.” Wilcox stated that “a large minority of couples are devel-
oping a renewed appreciation for the social and economic support that marriage and families can 
provide.” Interview: Love in an Economic Downturn, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Jan. 5, 
2010), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/228896/love-economic-downturn/interview. 
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What Does This Mean About Belonging? 
 
Social capital, the web of trust that means we belong to communi-
ties, here considered as social cohesion, or trust in one’s community, 
has an effect on marriages that may be surprising. However, if it is 
seen as another measure of belonging, or an indication of the support 
the spouses can receive from their community, it makes sense. Mar-
ried couples belong to each other. As the song from the film “Shrek” 
says about the traveling sweetheart, “I’ll be so alone without 
you/Maybe you’ll be lonesome too, . . . [for] you belong to me.”59 In 
some ways, parents also belong to their children.60 I believe Professor 
Hafen would be comfortable with thinking that they belong to the 
communities in which they live, so that when these communities lose 
cohesion, marriages lose valuable support and some increased number 
of them will dissolve.61 
                                                          
59 JASON WADE, YOU BELONG TO ME (2001). 
Fly the ocean 
In a silver plane 
See the jungle 
When it’s wet with rain 
Just remember till 
You’re home again 
You belong to me 
 
Oh I’ll be so alone without you 
Maybe you’ll be lonesome too 
60 That is, parents’ marriages will affect their children. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott, Rational 
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 11 (1990) (“Children typically 
bear substantial psychological and economic costs for a decision in which they have no role.”); 
Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage “For the Sake of the Children”: A Feminist Reply to Eliz-
abeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1435, 1440–42 (1992). In this sense, belonging is made explicit 
by, of all things, the property distribution provisions of the Marriage and Divorce Act, which 
allows courts to set aside some share of the marital property specifically to protect the children.  
61 As Dean Hafen wrote some years ago, “In addition, the law’s ultimate goal in support-
ing family ties is the sustaining of ongoing relationships, not merely the crude determining of 
who is right and who is wrong, who wins and who loses.” Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional 
Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 
81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 470 (1983). 
